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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
WANDA MAP*" rt:"™ETT BAG SHAW, ) 
Plaintifr-Respondent, ) 
vs. ) 
J OSEPH ARTHUR BAGS Hi W, ' . . ) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) 
BRIE* OJ 
Case No. 880647-CA 
(Priority No. ) 
I*" APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Tu: ~ :~ :.- :-"-•-;-.": fv-r- - final -'ldgment J n a civil domestic 
relations articn filed wi^h:" *" days from the entry of the Order 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the Court err in not ruling that good cause existed 
to enter a Nunc Pro Tunc Order modifying the Decree of Divorce 
previously entered on November 28, 1973? 
2. Did the Court err in applying and giving retroactive 
effect to the legal reguirements set forth in Brown v. Brown, 744 P. 2d 
333 (Utah, App. 1987)? 
3. Did the Court err in not estopping the Plaintiff from 
enforcing a Judgment for alimony? 
4. Did the Court err in finding that the Plaintiff, by making 
representations that alimony did not exist in the Decree and that 
she would sign an agreement vacating the alimony, waived her right 
to alimony after November, 1973? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 30-4a~l (1953, as amended), s t a t e s a s f o l l o w s : 
"A Court having jurisdiction may, upon it's finding of good 
cause and giving of such notice as may be ordered, enter an 
Order Nunc Pro Tunc in a matter relating to marriage, divorce, 
legal separation or annulment of marriage." 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
A Divorce Decree was entered in this case, based upon the 
Default Consent signed by the Defendant without an attorney, on 
January 10, 1973. In that Decree, the Defendant was ordered to pay 
to the Plaintiff $200.00 per month as alimony pursuant to Paragraph 
3 of the Divorce Decree. The Defendant filed an Order to Show 
Cause seeking modification of the Decree and termination of the 
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alimony award, dated June 13, 1973. The matter was brought on for 
hearing on November 28, 1973, at which time the Minute Entry 
reflected that a written Stipulation was reached between the 
parties. 
On February 25, 1988, the Plaintiff filed with the Court an 
Order to Show Cause seeking Judgment for unpaid alimony arrearages 
for the 8 years preceding the Order to Show Cause. The Defendant 
moved the Court to enforce the previous Stipulation referred to in 
the November 24, 1973 minutes. The Defendant reguested the Court 
enter the Order, Nunc Pro Tunc, terminating the alimony or, in the 
alternative, to find that the Plaintiff had cohabited since the 
date of the Divorce Decree and was no longer entitled to any award 
of alimony. 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick found that the Plaintiff was 
entitled to a Judgment against the Defendant in the sum of 
$19,400.00 because there was not an enforceable Stipulation entered 
into between the parties. The Court did not find that no agreement 
took place, but found instead that the agreement was not 
enforceable. The Court also ruled that the Plaintiff did not 
unlawfully cohabitate subseguent to the entry of the Divorce 
Decree. 
The Plaintiff received a Judgment based upon the written 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order entered by the 
Court and the Defendant/Appellant has filed a timely Appeal. 
3 
B. Course of Proceeding. 
The Complaint was filed in this case on April 7, 1972 (file 
document 000002). A Decree was entered January 10, 1973, 
originally pursuant to a Stipulation of the parties and the Default 
of the Defendant in 1973 concerning the Default Divorce (see 
attachments). At the time the Divorce Decree was entered, the 
Defendant was not represent by counsel. After the Divorce Decree 
was entered, the Defendant obtained legal counsel who filed a 
Petition for Order to Show Cause on May 17, 1973 alleging that the 
Decree of Divorce provided for alimony contrary to representations 
made by the Plaintiff to the Defendant that there would be no 
alimony (see file document 000016, attachment 1). An Order to Show 
Cause was entered on June 26, 1973 (see attachment 2). 
The Defendant's Petition for Order to Show Cause was noticed 
for hearing on November 28, 1973. The Minute Entry indicated that 
based on the Stipulation of respective counsel, the Court ordered 
that the Order to Show Cause was continued pending written 
Stipulation and Order (see file document 000023, attached). The 
trial Judge at that time was the Honorable G. Hal Taylor. 
When the Plaintiff filed an Order to Show Cause in February, 
1988, to enforce alimony, this matter came on first before the 
Domestic Relations Commissioner of the Court, Sandra Peuler. The 
Commissioner entered a recommendation ruling in favor of the 
Plaintiff and the Defendant filed an objection. The objection came 
on for hearing before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick of the 
Court and an evidentiary hearing was held before the Court on July 
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21, 1988. The Defendant called, as witnesses, both the Plaintiff 
and Defendant's prior attorneys, and his present wife, Darlene 
Bagshaw. The Plaintiff called as a witness the Plaintiff, Wanda 
Marie Sackett Bagshaw as a witness. 
The Court took the matter under advisement and after receiving 
Memorandum from the parties, entered a Minute Entry which states: 
This Court is not persuaded that the parties arrived 
at an enforceable Stipulation to modify the Decree of 
Divorce to eliminate alimony. Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah 
App., 1987). 
C. Disposition at Trial Court. 
The Plaintiff received a Judgment against the Defendant for 
the sum of $19,400*00 to and including unpaid child support due to 
March 31, 1988 and each party was ordered to assume their own 
attorney's fees and costs. 
RELEVANT FACTS 
At the hearing, the Defendant called to the stand Darlene 
Bagshaw, the Defendant's new wife, who appeared with him at the 
time of the hearing on November 28, 19 73. She indicated that she 
came with Mr. Bagshaw to the hearing which took place in the Third 
District Court (Transcript, Page 3). She testified that on the day 
before the hearing, she received a telephone call from the 
Plaintiff, the Defendant's ex-wife, Wanda Bagshaw (Page 4). She 
heard Joseph Bagshaw indicate to Wanda Bagshaw that there was Court 
on the following day and he made a threat to her concerning Court 
(Pg. 4). The next day, she appeared with her husband at Court 
where they met her husband's attorney, Mr. Gilbert Athay. The 
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witness recalled that Wanda Bagshaw1s lawyer came up to them and 
indicated that Wanda was not going to appear that day because she 
was upset concerning the threats Joe had made to her (Pg. 5). She 
testified that on the day of the Court hearing, that the two 
attorneys, Wanda Bagshaw*s attorney and her husband, Joseph 
Bagshaw1 s, attorney, went into a small room in the back of the 
Courtroom at which conversations took place concerning settling the 
case that day (Pg. 7). She indicated that her husband, Mr. 
Bagshaw, said that he would let go of his claim concerning the Jeep 
and his portion of a Federal Tax Return, which Wanda Bagshaw had 
taken and also agreed not to press charges against her for theft 
concerning the Jeep in exchange for her dropping the alimony 
charges. She recalled that Mr. Bagshaw had stated during the 
meeting that he didn't know that there had been alimony provisions 
placed in the Divorce Decree until his brother had read the Decree 
to him. 
Darlene Bagshaw testified that an agreement was reached over 
the phone and that her lawyer represented that she was talking to 
Wanda Bagshaw and Wanda Bagshaw indicated that she had agreed to 
the settlement. She indicated that the attorneys were to draw up 
a Stipulation, that his portion of the Federal check was to go 
towards child support and that Joe would not press any theft 
charges concerning the Jeep and that the alimony would be dropped 
from the Divorce Decree (Pg. 8). 
She indicated that after the meeting, her husband attempted 
to call attorney Gil Athay on several occasions to see whether or 
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not the papers had been completed (Pg. 9)* Even though the papers 
were never completed, she indicated that her husband believed that 
the alimony amounts had been paid (Pg. 10). 
Joseph Arthur Bagshaw was sworn as a witness and testified 
that at the time he signed the document allowing her to proceed to 
a default divorce, that he did not have an attorney and did not 
read at the time (Pg. 13). Mr. Bagshaw testified that his wife at 
the time, Wanda Bagshaw, in a telephone conversation from St. 
George, Utah said that she wanted a quick divorce and child support 
and that he merely sign the papers at the place where she indicated 
that he needed to sign and mail them back to her (Pg. 14). He 
indicated that after the Divorce Decree was entered, his brother 
read the Decree to him and he found out for the first time that he 
was paying $200.00 in alimony (Pg. 15). After trying to contact 
Mrs. Bagshaw concerning the alimony, he retained Robert Van Sciver 
to act as his attorney and on May 17, 1973, he signed a document 
which was a Petition for Order to Show Cause. 
1. That he is the Defendant in the above-entitled matter. 
That he is unable to read and that it was represented to 
the Defendant by the Plaintiff that he, if he executed 
certain documents, there would be no alimony. 
2. That the Decree of Divorce entered herein provides for 
alimony and based upon such misrepresentations, the 
Defendant acquiesced in securing of a Decree of Divorce. 
Therefore, the same should be modified eliminating that 
provision relating to alimony. 
3. Further, there has been the taking, by the Plaintiff of 
Income Tax Return, a portion of which should be paid to 
the Defendant. (See Petition for Order to Show Cause 
entered July 13, 1973 as part of the record in this 
matter, attached hereto.) 
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Mr. Bagshaw indicated that on the day of Court on November 28, 
1973, an agreement was reached that there would be no alimony if 
he would drop the charges of her taking the Jeep and the Federal 
check (Pg. 18). He indicated that "half the check would go to her and half would 
come to me but then we agreed that all of it would go to her because" he was giving her 
his portion of the check as credit for child support. He indicated 
that she agreed to drop the alimony based upon his foregoing of 
filing any theft charges against her concerning the taking of the 
Jeep and that he fulfilled his part of the bargain by not pursuing 
the theft charges. In his presence at the time of the meeting 
between the attorneys on the day in question, he stated that he 
heard her attorney, Spencer Haycock, indicate that she had agreed 
to the proposal (Pg. 19). From the time of the Court hearing on 
November 28, 1973 until he received the Order to Show Cause in 
February, 1988, his ex-wife, Wanda, did not make any claims for any 
alimony, even though she did bring an action concerning child 
support through the Department of Social Services (Pg. 20). 
Exhibits were introduced in this matter that indicated that 
documents were served on him in February, 1986 concerning the child 
support obligations which were initiated by the Plaintiff, Wanda 
Bagshaw. On July 16, 1987, he reached an agreement fully settling 
the child support debt with the Department of Recovery Services 
(Pg. 21 and Exhibit "3"). 
Mr. Bagshaw testified that in 1975, his ex-wife, Wanda 
Bagshaw, informed him that she was expecting a child and was 
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pregnant (Pg. 24). Mr. Bagshaw stated that he had not had sexual 
relations with her and was not the father of the child (Pg. 25). 
He indicated that it was not until February of 1988 that he 
discovered that she was still making a claim for alimony despite 
the agreement of November, 1973 (Pg. 26). 
The Defendant called as witnesses, both of the attorneys 
representing the parties at the November 28, 1973 hearing. D. 
Gilbert Athay testified that in 1973 he was a partner with Robert 
Van Sciver, the attorney who filed the Petition on behalf of Mr. 
Bagshaw (Transcript Vol. II, pg. 4). Mr. Athay testified that 
after hearing the testimony of Darlene Bagshaw and Joseph Bagshaw, 
that he did not have a recollection as to the events of November, 
1973 (Pg. 5). 
The Plaintiff's attorney in 1973 was Mr. Spencer Haycock (Pg. 
7). Mr. Haycock testified that he, like Mr. Athay, did not have 
any independent recollection of the November 28th hearing. He did 
say that he had a limited recollection that his client had cashed 
a check and sold the Jeep and that the parties had come back to 
Court (Pg. 9). 
The Defendant/Appellant also called as a witness Joseph Lavar 
Bagshaw (Vol. II, Pg 32). He testified that he was the son of the 
parties and lived with his mother, the Plaintiff, after the Divorce 
until 1980. In 1975, his mother gave birth to another child. 
Prior to that time, he saw male individuals at the residence but 
could not testify as to whether these persons stayed overnight. 
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Wanda Marie Sackett Bagshaw was called to testify as to her 
recollection of the proceedings (Vol. II, Pg. 15). She testified 
that she knew her ex-husband had retained an attorney and that she 
met with the attorneys (Pg. 17). She acknowledged that there was 
a dispute with her ex-husband over a Federal check and the Jeep 
automobile (Pg. 19). She stated that she did not verbally agree 
to waive alimony. 
The Plaintiff/Respondent admitted that she gave birth to a 
child in 1975 (Pg. 26). She also testified that in 1972 she 
assigned to the Department of Recovery Service of the State of Utah 
the right to receive child support and alimony (Pg. 17). She 
acknowledged that from 1972 until 1981, she received public 
assistance and for a few months in 1984 (Pg. 16). She stated that 
during this period of time when she was receiving assistance, she 
was required to pay over any money she received for alimony to the 
Department of Recovery Services (Pg. 17). The Assignment of 
Collection of Support Payments was filed with the Court in 19 75 
when the State of Utah, Department of Social Services was joined 
as a party (see file document 000024 and 000025, attached). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Did the Court err in not ruling that good cause existed 
to enter a Nunc Pro Tunc Order modifying the Decree of Divorce 
previously entered on November 28, 1973? 
2. Did the Court err in applying and giving retroactive 
effect to the legal requirements set forth in Brown v. Brown, "44 P. 2d 333 
(Utah, App. 1987)? 
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3. Did the Court err in not estopping the Plaintiff from 
enforcing a Judgment for alimony? 
4. Did the Court err in finding that the Plaintiff, by making 
representations that alimony did not exist in the Decree and that 
she would sign an agreement vacating the alimony, waived her right 
to alimony after November, 1973? 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
GOOD CAUSE EXISTS FOR THE COURT TO ENTER A NUNC 
PRO TUNC ORDER MODIFYING THE DECREE AS OF 
NOVEMBER 28,1973, BASED ON EITHER THE STIPULATION 
OR THE MERITS OF THE PENDING ACTION. 
Utah Code Annotated. 30-4a-l (As Amended, 1984) states: 
A Court having jurisdiction may, upon its 
findings of good cause and giving of such 
notice as may be ordered, enter an order Nunc 
Pro Tunc in a matter relating to marriage, 
divorce, legal separation or annulment of 
marriage. 
The first case interpreting this broad and remedial statute 
which is unique in Utah to domestic proceedings is the recent case 
of Home v. Home, 737 P.2d, 244 (Utah App. 1987). In this decision the Court 
of Appeals set forth for the first time the parameters of the Nunc 
Pro Tunc statute giving discretion to a court to grant special 
relief in domestic matters when errors or omissions occur. The 
Defendant respectfully submits that the trial Court had 
jurisdiction and authority to enter an order modifying the alimony 
provision of the Bagshaw Decree as of November 28, 1973, setting 
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aside and vacating the alimony provisions on agreement of the 
parties under the authority of the statute. 
In Home, the Court of Appeals discussed in detail the 
legislative history of Utah Code Annotated, 30-4a-I% (1984) f and indicated 
that the history of the Nunc Pro Tunc statute revealed "an intent 
to give to the courts broad discretion to enter orders Nunc Pro 
Tunc in domestic proceedings where an obvious injustice would 
otherwise result." The Court found that the statute applied to all 
aspects of domestic proceedings and was not limited to cases 
involving only marital status of the parties as under the former 
statue which it replaced. 
Under common law and previous Utah decisions, the doctrine of 
Nunc Pro Tunc required a condition precedent that the Court find 
that a previous final order has been made at an earlier date. See 
for example, Preece v. Preece, 682 P.2d 288. (Utah, 1984). Thus, prior to 
enactment of the statute, an order could only be entered after a 
previously final order, a court could remedy only a prior 
accomplished act which arose to the status of a final order. 
The Court in Home ruled that the analysis and holding of Preece 
v. Preece, was statutorily overruled and that unlike common law, the 
Court only needs to find "good cause" to correct errors or supply 
omissions. The Court held that the statute gives to courts wide 
discretion to prevent "obvious injustices", and to accurately 
reflect that which in fact took place without the technical 
restraints under previous law. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
"The meaning of 'good cause1 must be 
determined on a case by case basis, in light 
of all of the surrounding circumstances, or 
equity and justice required. 
The Court, in reversing the trial Courtfs application of the 
statute in the Home divorce, indicated that the statute should be 
applied to give effect to the parties f prior intentions and not to 
substitute the Court's judgment for the judgment of the parties* 
Mr. Bagshaw proved to the trial Court that he would suffer an 
obvious injustice if the trial Court did not enter a Nunc Pro Tunc 
Order modifying the alimony provisions of the Decree. Judgment 
was entered against him and in favor of the Plaintiff for alimony 
which he had reasonably believed was resolved by Stipulation 
fifteen years prior to Plaintiff's Order to Show Cause. The 
Plaintiff, Mrs. Bagshaw, on the other hand, admitted that she did 
not demand or prosecute her purported claim for alimony until only 
recently, even though there had been payment demands and full 
payment of child support. 
The Defendant established good cause under the special 
circumstances of this case, upon which the Court could have 
enforced the agreement, or granted Motion on the merits. Those 
include any of the following: 
1. The original decree was a default decree based upon the 
Plaintiff's misrepresentation that no alimony would be 
in the decree. 
2* At the time of the Consent to Enter Default, the 
Defendant could not read and relied on the Plaintiff, 
without consulting an attorney. 
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3. The hearing was noticed by Defendant's counsel for the 
date of November 28, 1973 and not by Plaintiff's counsel. 
4. The Defendant's testimony and minute entry reflects that 
the parties intended to file a written stipulation to be 
reduced to an order and the alimony issue was the primary 
contention between the parties. 
5. The Defendant forgave his claim for the funds from the 
forgery of his name on the check and the unauthorized 
taking of the Jeep and the Plaintiff admitted to the 
unauthorized acts. 
6. The Plaintiff assigned to a governmental third party 
agency the right to collect alimony and had never 
actively pursued her claim until 1988 (see Exhibit 
concerning assignment with Recovery Services). 
7. No alimony collection proceedings were ever instituted 
by the Plaintiff after November 28, 1973, until the 
present action, or the Department of Recovery Services 
even though the Defendant fully resolved and satisfied 
all child support claims. 
8. The Defendant was present in Utah and was not aware of 
the omission to formally enter the stipulation and was 
never notified of the omission by any enforcement by the 
Plaintiff. 
9. The Order to Show Cause was continued pending the 
Stipulation and the matter was still pending and had 
never been adjudicated. 
The broad remedial power to correct injustices in domestic 
matters under Utah Code Annotated, 30-4a-l (1984), should have been invoked 
by the Court in this matter. The Defendant does not need to prove 
the existence of a written stipulation or unsigned court order 
under the broad powers granted under the statute as interpreted by 
the Court in Home v. Home. In Home, the Court noted that even under 
the common law power of Nunc Pro Tunc, the Court was allowed to 
correct errors or supply omissions to the record accurately 
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reflecting that which in fact took place. The Court could and 
should have considered the merits of the Defendant's Petition which 
had newr been denied or dismissed. 
The expanded scope of the doctrine under the statute should 
include errors by attorneys in submitting orders as well as the 
traditional clerical errors. In a domestic matter, the trial Court 
has continuing equity jurisdiction and the Court should have 
rendered the unjust, harsh and inequitable situation created 
without fault of the Defendant personally. This case presents the 
exact type of situation which the legislature designed the Nunc Pro 
Tunc Statute. That is, a technical defect unnoticed by one party 
and not prosecuted by the other party that is brought to the 
Court's attention pursuant to the continuing power to make 
equitable decisions in domestic matters. 
Therefore, the Court should reverse the trial Court decision 
and enter an order effective November 28, 1973 setting aside and 
vacating the alimony provision of the Decree. 
The Court did not consider entering the Order Nunc Pro Tunc 
and, instead, merely found the agreement unenforceable because it 
had not been reduced to a writing. The record itself reflects that 
the Defendant's Order to Show Cause to vacate alimony was continued 
pending a written Stipulation (see attachment 4). 
The Nunc Pro Tunc statute was designed to avoid the injustice 
which results from the trial Court's technical application of Brown 
v. Brown and in not considering this matter beyond the Stipulation. 
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The Court should have ruled that the alimony should have been 
modified and then retroactively entered this Order to avoid the 
harsh injustice of the ruling. 
The Defendant's Petition to Modify the Decree, pending since 
1973, has never been denied. The trial Court should have ruled 
that the alimony should have been vacated and used the Nunc Pro 
Tunc statutes to enter the Order as of 1973. The Court did not 
have to enforce the Stipulation and could have ruled on the merits 
because, under the Plaintiff's theory, the Stipulation was 
unenforceable because it was not technically signed or entered. 
The Nunc Pro Tunc statutes gave the Court the power to inquire 
into this injustice. Instead, the Court refused to consider this 
matter and enforced the alimony without consideration of the 
remedial statute. 
POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE APPLIED THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
BROWN V. BROWN TO FIND THE STIPULATION UNENFORCEABLE. 
The Judge ruled in this case that the parties had not arrived 
at an enforceable Stipulation to Modify the Decree of Divorce and 
specifically cited the recent case of Brown v. Brown, 744 P. 2d 333 (Utah App., 
1987). 
In Brown, the Court of Appeals ruled that under Utah Rules of 
Practice of the District Court, 4.5 (b), a stipulation not 
continued in a writing signed by the parties or filed with the 
clerk was not an enforceable stipulation. In Brown, the Court noted 
in discussing what constituted a stipulation, that stipulations 
16 
could be enforceable to the extent that justice requires 
enforcement in view of potential change of position in reliance on 
the promise or agreement (Citing Re Statement (Second) of 
Contracts, Section 94 (1987)). The Brown Court also quoted a 
section of American Jurisprudence, which stated that stipulations 
could be asserted if 'entered upon the Minutes of the Court'• 
In Brown, the Court said that the Statute of Frauds and Rules 
of Practice 4.5 (b), that Stipulation was made not in Court in the 
context of a hearing, but at a Deposition where the agreement was 
read on the record by the attorneys. 
However, in 1973, there was no rule in effect such as Rule 4.5 
(b) of the Utah Rules of Practice. The trial Court should not have 
applied the ruling and requirements of Brown v. Brown, which was based 
upon the rule of practice to the 1973 Stipulation. In Jensen v. Fames, 
519 P. 2d 236 (Utah, 1974), the Utah Supreme Court announced the basic rule 
that rules of procedure, if it impairs rights of a party, should 
not be applied and that only if there is no impairment, that the 
amended procedure will be applied (see also Cheny v. Rucker, 381 P. 2d 86 
(Utah, 1963) and Utah Sand and Gravel v. Tolbert, 402 P. 2d 703 (Utah, 1965). 
The Court should not have applied the technical requirements 
of Brown v. Brown in this case and should have proceeded to determine 
whether the Stipulation to terminate alimony should have been 
enforced under the Nunc Pro Tunc statute. In this case, the 
hearing of November 1973, was being held on the Petition and Notice 
of the Defendant to vacate the alimony provisions. The parties 
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were present at the Court and a Minute Entry was filed indicating 
the Order to Show Cause of the Defendant was continued pending 
written Stipulation and Order (see attachment 4). 
In any event, the Court should not have denied the Petition 
by not considering the power to enter an Order under the Nunc Pro 
Tunc statute. The requirements of Brown were applied retroactively 
in a case where the merits should have been reviewed under the 
Court's equity power. 
POINT III 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT 
FINDING, UNDER CONTINUING EQUITY JURISDICTION, 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED FROM REDUCING THE 
ALIMONY AWARD TO A JUDGMENT. 
In cases such as Larsen v. Larsen, 300 P.2d, 596 (Utah, 1956) and Ross v. Ross, 
592 P.2d 600 (Utah, 1919), the Utah Courts have recognized that under 
equitable jurisdiction of the Court, a party may be estopped from 
enforcing the provisions of a divorce decree. In those cases, the 
party must prove that the other party by her representations or 
actions led him to believe he need not pay alimony and the party 
in reliance on such representations damaged his position to his 
detriment. In such cases, the hardship and injustice because of 
enforcement of the decree under the circumstances is the reason for 
applying the doctrine of estoppel. 
The cases relied on by the Plaintiff such as Scott v. Scott, 430 P.2d 
580 (Utah, 1967), involve enforcement issues concerning foreign divorces 
and do not overrule Larsen and Ross. In the case before the trial 
Court, the Decree was originally entered by the Court and this 
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a c t i o n was t h e f i r s t t ime bo th p a r t i e s had been b e f o r e t h e Cour t 
c r.rie
 A s > .«- s i n c e - * 
appl . an , - » i. . r>..pport fir:; a i m o , * n i l e s.;h s equen t 
d e c i s i o n a\ \ s t educe ' tpr i ^ a ' t r 1 1 * ^ "L LAinc *" <^ixi.d 
s , . HP a p p l , m . r- ^o 
a i . n t \ c ia i iv .- . H *-"tr vour- wic c ^<t .y : "ons . :er t n e 
D e f e t d a n t / A p p e l l a n t ' •* ^ • r i m e n t ? Ka ed on L.U " * 
ii < -.v i ; . . ; . P p r o c e e d i n g s . Haraini Harding, 
4XH p \. n;* . • t h e a l t e r n a t i v e , t h e Court shou ld a v e r s e 
th *- ma t tp" * d 
. C'p . : . . o . ^ n i j u.junoiiy * t h e bas iL >: w a i v e r . 
The r e c o r ( .,r>po] t s *•!**-* f o l i r w v - M ^ •: S * ^ f i n d i n g t h e 
I . _. ; . u e t r
 t..,-
t c.ainiifr nad assignee tt^ . L::II to alimo.^ ' •. the 
Department of Recovery Services and the Defendant had 
fully spftled +-1*, -"« with Dnr,o'/e^' Se~T -p? 
.^ w^ . : i x oc .aiit .;:.srepresentation3 at tte i^ e cf 
staining . .-onsen* :• auiauxi, .i.a 
agreeing :<• va^ art- r forego the aiimorr . 
~; The Defendant had relied, to i:;s detriment, on these 
misrepresentation in not bringing the Order to Show Cause 
back to Court to en^nrrp fK-> <^f- i ru.r ^*~ ; or 
Tlle Defendant continued to pay chiic support and did not 
obtain compensation for fhp J^ -^ r <-*• ^ > - P H endorsemert 
on the check. 
l») The Defendant .-ciiMui. .. ,acatc
 rtJ^,.^. ^  w'as still 
pending when the Plaintiff attempted to obtain a 
J udgm •••:'• * 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant/Appellant discovered that his Petition to Set 
Aside the Alimony was never formally resolved when the 
Plaintiff/Respondent sought to enforce alimony for the first time 
since 1973. The trial Court did not attempt to remedy the 
injustice by ruling on the merits of the original Petition or by 
applying the Nunc Pro Tunc statute* Instead, the trial Court 
focused on the "enforceability" of the Stipulation* 
This Court should confront the issue raised by the 
Defendant/Appellant by either determining that the Nunc Pro Tunc 
statute was applicable and reversing and setting aside the 
Judgment, or in the alternative, remanding this matter back for a 
new hearing with directions to the trial Court to consider the 
merits of the still pending Petition to Set Aside the Alimony 
Provisions under the broad remedial powers of the Nunc Pro Tunc 
statute as interpreted by this Court. 
RANDALL GMTHER 
Attprney for Defendant-Appellant 
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant was hand delivered to Mr. John Spencer 
Snow, Attorney at Law, 261 East 300 South, Suite 350, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84111, on this day of February, 1989. 
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ADDENDUM 
A l 1 + a *:. iit~es v*-*r P • * I ' • >n * ^ r h a h i r :\ t h e BI in H* I 
c* It:1- -
•ecret < I . ,e dooiP'er t OOC • : : :;%: • 0 0012) . 
Petition ioi Order LO Shovv ^ U D C (file document "n n in 14 
and 000015). 
rder to '- *riw fj M ^  ' f i J ^  'Jc^jmen*" 000 0" ' y- , 
i minute EnL^i » i * , - uu<. ujne. L «J 
5) findings of "-•- < : <*^lCl . * ,iw(i iLu document 000135) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
731 East South Temple JAN 1 0 1973 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: 322-3551 _ 4 *<3&U£L 
-L 
w. ct-riu^  ^ M ^ M 1* OML COM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WANDA MARIE SACKETT BAGSHAW, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW, 
Defendant. 
""BTfr^iv. 3)17 
1-11*13 %m hM, 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. D-6775 
The above entitled cause having come on regularly for 
hearing, Plaintiff being present in person and represented by coun-
sel, Spencer L. Haycock, and the Defendant not appearing nor being 
represented by counsel but it appearing to the Court that the 
Defendant has heretofore filed his waiver and appearance wherein he 
waived time in which to answer or otherwise plead and consented 
that the matter may be heard at any time without further notice to 
him; and the default of the Defendant having been entered and the 
Court having heard the sworn testimony of the Plaintiff and being 
fully advised in the premises and the Court having filed its Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore, upon motion of 
Spencer L. Haycock, attorney for Plaintiff, it is 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff is awarded a Decree of Divorce dissolving 
the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore existing between the 
parties; provided, however, that said Decree shall not become final 
until the expiration of three months from the date of its entry 
herein. Provided further that said Decree shall not become final 
if during said period proceedings for review are pending or the 
Court otherwise orders. 
ooqoix 
J'hai p l a i n t i f f I s awarded t h e custody , c a r e d\\d < i , r l 1 
1,1 f t h a two m i n o r ; 11 i M w • 11 i l i i s f i nl i I
 ( r ' n i nil nri i i ij 1 «<jIn ( "i iJD~J ee t I. 
i"f»d son i h i o , i i i , 11 i i t. i i «J t l u n by D e f e n d a n t . 
3 T'h.it P l a i n t i f f i s awarded the sura of $100.00 per month 
per chi"*. : • : - :>b* :- >:\c maintenance of t,r,e said rino:* ch i l d r en anc 
fur ther • .\ i\ Defendant i s ordered to per.; tz F P ; - ' . ' * ' r.-- ** z 
$200.00 per merit;; *s . . *-f - 3 
medical = . . .
 t . • , . . - - ..CL J.: 
nine-lid i t i hi' medical expenses, that he provide an adequate pol icy 
of hea1th ii isurance for sa id c h i l d r e n . 
4 T-.^t p l a i n t i t f is awarded the household goods and 
fu rn i sh ings , and tne 1962 Ford automeb. - *hs* :s Defender* 
award ed the I 9iS 2 Jeer * a t - ^ nob . I *.-
and cair 
•=.!,: id: -..-. _ a e r e d to assume and pay the deb ts 
e..u ^^-iyo Lions i. near red d^nr.u - e course of the marriage inc lud in 
the balance owing 3*.i ,ie >v torne) fee he re in in the sum of $200.00 
ana n c . i Pla.ru fr harmless therefrom. 
«-- -O 
^ ^ , ^ " , ? • 
DATED t h i < = ^ • ~ o5,! *' 7 ; . 
JUDG: 
<iilIlllJJL-I 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
321 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
322-5678 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WANDA MARIE SACKETT BAGSHAW, 
Plaintiff, 
V S . J 
JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW, 
Defendant. : 
j PETITION FOR 
: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. D-6775 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
Joseph? Arthur Bagshaw, the defendant above named 
petitions the Court as follows: 
1. That he is the defendant in the above entitled 
matter. That he is unable to read, and it was represented 
to the defendant by the plaintiff that if he executed certain 
documents, there would be no alimony. 
2. That the Decree of Divorce entered herein 
provides for alimony and based upon such misrepresentations, 
the defendant acquiesced in the securing of a Decree of 
Divorce. Therefore, the same should be modified eliminating 
that provision relating to alimony. 
3* Further, that there has been the taking by 
the plaintiff of an income tax return, a portion of which 
should be paid to the defendant. 
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays for the issuance of 
an Order to Show Cause, requiring the plaintiff to appear 
r»*.«„*v /•!»«. 
000014 
v
'i J i i *.. :v. „ e ; r e t orce \* " f i ^ c t 
t ha t tr < , .-*. - , : f •- G i rded "r^  a l . r , :.y. 
rce i i r . ; . a m t i - f t c r e t u rn a per* « or of 
the inco.iit, u x re tu rn t, -he defendar* 
7^ 'JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW *" 
On this 'I'""'/ day of May, 1973, personally appeared 
before me Joseph Arthur Bagshaw, who duly acknowl edged to 
ne that he signed the foregoing voluntarily? that the contents 
t he re o f are t ru e an d co r r e ct to th e b e s t o £ h I s 1 :  now 1 edge, 
3 x c ep t a s t o ma 11 e r s s t a ted on In f o rma t i on an d b e .3 1 e £ a n d 
a s t o s 11 eh in a 11 e r s, h e b e 3 i eve s P\h em, t o b e ft iru^ „ 
yiy Commission Expi res : 
My Commission &ptrtf Xuft 10, I f f f 
•.^ CTSARi PUBLIC 
000« 
ROBERT VAN SCIVER 
Attorney for Defendant 
321 South Sixth East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
 w 
322-5678 
/ (^w^ t u k*C o u n^u t^"" J7 JUN 26\97* 
PMorol** 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WANDA MARIE SACKETT BAGSHAW, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW, : 
Defendant. : 
! ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Civil No. D-6775 
The above entitled matter came on for hearing upon 
the verified Petition of the defendant herein. Upon motion 
of Robert Van Sciver, Attorney for Defendant, and good cause 
appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff, Wanda 
Marie Sackett Bagshaw be and appear before the above entitled 
Court on the .•/^iay of «6Lj& 1973, at the 
hour of /S'/f /4 M. in courtroom number / , 240 East 
Fourth South, Salt Lake City, Utah, to then and there show 
cause, if any she has, why the following Order should not be 
entered: 
A. Modifying the Decree of Divorce to reflect 
that the plaintiff is awarded no alimony. 
B. Ordering plaintiff to return a portion of the 
income tax return to the defendant. 
DATED this Xr^aay of^ fety, 19 73. 
BY THE COURT: 
- P 
.W. STERWO'LVANS DISTRICT JUDGE 
• ner* 
OOOO: 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE - STATE OF UTAH 
t * piaintif/ Z. 
i Defendant 
D A 7 7 5 " 
Type of hearing: 
Present 
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Div- -Annul . 
D. Atty &) 
Sworn & Examined: 
Pltf 
Others _ 
Pltf, D e f t -
Tf /pr* &L 
. D e f t . 
Other-
Stipulation-
Publication. 
Default: Pltf. 
Date: N^V, &&• 
Judge: &t 
f _ Deft 
Clerk: ?L? /?, 7^&JL<L 
Reporter:
 : , 
Bailiff: . . 
ORDERS: 
Counseling ordered 
Custody study ordered. 
Custody awarded to 
Visitation rights- .Reasonable, or:« 
S u p p o r t _ . . _ $ _ X . , =$____per month Alimony. — $ _ .. Per month/year 
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Furnishings to Pltf. Deft, _ U s e o f _ _ 
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Divorce granted to_ 
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IV. is.& ^L^ 4jf T - C -«-lL coulee ' " l e ' O u r t . *e-
(DSC 
* ^ 
"JT Cj?««t? L^ 
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Page _ 00002J 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIKD TODXCTXjP^W*telg*»»wW u U t ^ T 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTA&UG ^JL ^9QQ 
J^^CLERK3ro0iST C0t!< 
WANDA MARIE SACKETT BAGSHAW, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH ARTHUR BAGSHAW, 
Defendant. 
H OIXON ^  
B Y . 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CIVIL NO. D-6775 
OEPUTY CLERK 
This Court is not persuaded that the parties arrived at an 
enforceable stipulation to modify the Decree of Divorce to 
eliminate alimony. Brown v. Brown, 744 P.2d 333 (Utah App. 1987). 
Counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare the Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment. 
Dated this day of August, 1988, 
jTTEST 
H OlXpN HifJDLEY 
QopwyOfcrk 
000U8J 
JOHN SPENCER SNOW, No. 3026 
SN0Wr HALLIDAY & BAKER 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-4940 
- *m 
Cierk 3rd Oist. Court 
[>o ' i tv C!*>r!< 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AMD FOR SI ' AKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
WANDA MARIE SACKETT BAGSFIAW, 
Plaint iff, 
vs. 
JOSEPH ARTHHP ^^^''pr^: 
Detendan1 . 
FINDINGS OP FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Gi.li Ha. u-07 75 
The Drier t< sn •* !«ain iff ane on 
regularly f» 
on TUPSday, 
The plaint i * - «,•*-
 t. • 
respective ^4* -'•»>, 
presented f r* > —* -=- t 
Randal 1 Gai 
recommendat . . -
the defendant 
and inelnd >,% * u 
commissinner f ^*her 
been modi ftp i HH i »•»• 
terip i nstf a" * :\\ a ><1 
r* • ^ e iomesMc -^lati ;ns ommissioner 
*^- - «• M u r ' ^ r 
•e. <* >n . -epreser.-e*: - ' 
per.f er * . - * - ^  :M*enda* " «•--
represented < .*especM*'- a** r" **^  
m<»«at-f<~ -P.-frjons "ommissiorir r maoe *--
~.a ; f *- awarded judgment against 
< -parage *•" - * $1 4 ;' 
^8 - - )me^ - • - M - s 
. .
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 ' ' a> r "ie decree of .1 . -: e • a<: 
v : : *» n <• e , st ip'.la** -
•ie iefendant had *ai.eci *** nis ourden 
000133 
of proof. The domestic relations commissioner further found that 
there was no evidence of unlawful cohabitation and that the State 
of Utah had no interest in any portion of the alimony judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff. The domestic relations commissioner 
further found that the plaintiff had the right to rely upon the 
said decree of divorce without modification. The domestic 
relations commissioner made no specific recommendation as to the 
payment of attorney fees and costs. The said defendant filed an 
objection to the recommendation of the domestic relations 
commissioner and sought an evidentiary hearing by pleading 
entered on the 6th day of April, 1988. The said defendant 
further filed a motion to enter stipulation, order and judgment 
dated the 6th day of April, 1988. The objection to the 
recommendations of the domestic relations commissioner and the 
motion to enter stipulation, order and judgment and the said 
defendant came on for hearing before the above entitled court on 
the 21st day of July, 1988, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. The 
plaintiff was present in person and represented by her respective 
attorney, John Spencer Snow, and the defendant was present in 
person and represented by his respective attorney, Randall 
Gaither. Witnesses for both plaintiff and defendant were sworn 
and testified, including the parties themselves. Certain 
exhibits were introduced into evidence. The above entitled court 
heard the evidence and reviewed the exhibits introduced into 
evidence and made specific findings that there was no unlawful 
2 
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cohabitation •' "be p d:n* *: 
took under advisener.*-
Jul;;*** -» endar 
lire ** '*endc * *' ,1**14* 
m e m o ^ -, 1 . • ' -» 
base , -*ad,ngs --* : - eK'iiDr ^  
introduced into evidence* Hie defendant submitted proposed 
findings and memorandum of law with a onp\ nf tlip 'ranscript f 
the hear 1 ng if July .' " ""• Hb 4<?' »»d 1 he 1 s t day «»t ^n • j n •  t 1 <J0H 
The above eni It led 1 nut I Iwliii) t.ikr-n llm ml l 1 under 
advisement ijml lidv 1 uq 1 Hviewed nil if the pleadings on file, 
submitted Its minute pn l ,y ii.ifijii ine 4th cla^  d Aut.j"st ]9bn 
The above entitled coui 1 neunj I u I 1 y ddvised in t hn premises, 
and good cause appealing therein imw mdkefa the fol lowing 
FINDINGS OP FACT 
1
 1 " p ! 1 ini " * f "Ji'l rnjr commit any •*• ^a nf unlawful 
cohabitati m subsHquf1 ni in (MM pulry ui the decree of divorce In 
this acn.:-,. 
»" M J ' ei" " 1 'ii'J- 'ha: there W J S neither a 
stipulation between ihp parties as evidenced by a signed writing 
nor an "tgreement nf t he parties stated in court before a judge on 
the record as require"I ny Brown v , Hi • >wn 144 t .id 333 lUtnh 
App 1'18'n 
1
 There was no I PI 11. I .mi' I f alimony by reason of 
the actions or the plain* In 
3 
'•""•ninate a„ * 1 . 
?-tpr - * ^  pu 1 3 * f'de • -1 
* -d i * , *-t. ^ 
? r •'erne !> " 
;: t w. - .d rh** /'-" * > " .*-* 
000*37 
4. The parties did not arrive at an enforceable 
stipulation on or about the 28th day of November, 1973. 
5. The alimony provision in the decree of divorce was 
in full force and effect from and after its entry by the court to 
and including the present time. 
6. The parties did not enter into any enforceable 
stipulation to modify the decree of divorce to terminate alimony 
by the defendant to the plaintiff. 
7. The alimony remains in full force and effect and 
has not been terminated by the defendant by prior order of this 
court. 
From the foregoing findings of fact, the court now 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the 
defendant in the sum of $19,400.00 to and including March 31, 
1988. 
2. The motion to enter a stipulation, order and 
judgment of the said defendant is hereby denied. 
3. The plaintiff did not unlawfully cohabit 
subsequent to the entry of the decree of divorce. 
4. There is not enforceable stipulation entered into 
by and between the parties subsequent to the entry of the decree 
of divorce to terminate the obligation of the defendant to pay 
alimony to the plaintiff. 
4 
000x33 
5, liJ \M / is urdered to pay for bis or her own 
respective attorney fees n ml fur Mists of court Incurred In this 
action. 
, 1988. DATED this JO / . i, 
Approved as to form 
M / J/ f 
RANDALL GAI 
Attorney fo 
fc-z 
dant 
ENNIS FREDERICK 
u^t Judge 
TTEST 
H. 0IXON H1NOLEY 
Tj] ciw* 
D«puty C*«rk 
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